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I 
In "The Prospects for Consensus and Convergence in 
the Animal Rights Debate" Gary E. Varner altempts to 
provide a direction for reconciliation between utilitarian 
and inherent value views on the subject of biomedical 
research testing on nonhuman animals. 1 These two 
views are opposed because the former allows some 
testing and the latter does not. In this paper I will argue 
that Varner's prospect fails because its implications are 
in too strong ofan opposition to the inherent value view. 
First, I will sketch those basics of Singer's and 
Regan's views that are relevant to our discussion. 
Second, I will critically analyze the attempt by Gary 
Varner to open the way for convergence between the 
utilitarian and the inherent value views. I will then 
critically analyze a principle used by Regan, the "worse-
off' principle. Finally, out of these analyses I will 
suggest a new direction for exploration of the possibility 
of rapprochement between the utilitarian and inherent 
value views. 
II 
As expressed by Peter Singer, the utilitarian view holds 
that all interests of sentient individuals2 should be held 
to have equal value and that ethical decisions should 
be made in a manner that maximizes the aggregate 
positive outcomes in terms of those interests.3 This view 
allows some testing on nonhuman animals as long as 
the projected outcome for sentient creatures in general 
is a maximum. 
The inherent value view, as expressed by Tom 
Regan, holds that individuals who have autonomy with 
regard to preferences are subjects-of-a-life and, 
therefore, have an inherent value.4 For Regan, this 
includes some nonhuman animals.5 Furthennore, any 
such individual has the right not to be harmed if that 
harm is for the benefit merely of other sentient 
individuals. According to Regan, this view allows no 
testing of nonhuman animals for purposes of 
biomedical research. 
Although Regan holds that generally a subject-of-
a-life cannot be harmed if the purpose is to benefit 
only other individuals, there are cases where he allows 
this guideline to be overridden. He allows it to be 
overridden, for example, in cases where it seems 
impossible not to harm an individual who has moral 
rights. Regan has two principles that can be employed 
in such cases: the mini-ride and worse-off principles. 
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The mini-ride principle says that under circumstances 
of comparable harms, action should be taken so that 
the fewest possible are harmed. The idea here is that it 
is better, when you must violate the rights of individuals, 
that you engage in as few instances of it as possible.6 
For our purposes, though, we are mainly interested in 
Regan's worse-off principle. 
The worse-off principle says that under circum-
stances ofnoncomparable harms, individuals who stand 
to lose the most, in terms of the degree of their capacity 
to form and satisfy desires, ought not to be harmed. 
Consider Regan's application of this principle to the 
following exceptional case.7 There are five individuals 
in a lifeboat that can only support four. Four of the 
individuals are normal humans, and one of the 
individuals is a normal dog. Who ought to go 
overboard? The answer that the worse-off principle 
gives is that the dog ought to go overboard. The dog 
has a much less sophisticated capacity to form and 
satisfy desires, so he or she would be much less worse-
off dead than any of the humans would be. Moreover, 
this principle implies that any number of dogs could be 
thrown overboard in order to save just one human. 
Regan also holds that "[w]hat the rights view implies 
should be done in exceptional cases... ,including lifeboat 
cases, ...cannot fairly be generalized to unexceptional 
cases."g And he also tells us that the worse-off principle 
"...applies in cases where we must choose between 
harming one innocent or hanning another.'09 Regan does 
not think that judgments made about "isolated, 
exceptional cases" can be transferred to practices on a 
normal institutional level. On an institutional level, one 
ought never to be put under the influence of circum-
stances that force one to choose between harming one 
of two innocent individuals. 
III 
In his article, Varner analyzes Singer's and Regan's 
views and proposes to show that although Regan's view 
seems to prohibit any nonhuman animal testing, on 
closer inspection, there does appear to be a possibility 
for continued discussion between the two sides. 
Varner claims, on the basis of how the worse-off 
principle handles the lifeboat case, that "this principle, 
coupled with [Regan's] conception ofharm, would seem 
to imply that at least some research is not only 
permissible but required, even on a true animal rights 
view."lo Varner argues that since the death of a human 
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being is noncomparably worse than the death of a 
nonhuman animal, "if we knew by performing fatal 
research on a given number of animals we could save 
even one human life, then the worse-off principle would 
apply, and it would require us to perform theresearch."11 
Now, I think that Varner's claim here does not fully 
appreciate the necessity of constraining in some way 
the application of the worse-off principle. He imputes 
to Regan the view that what constrains the application 
of the worse-off principle is the need to acquire consent 
from subjects in order to place them at risk. 12 But this 
is clearly wrong. What primarily constrains the worse-
offprinciple is that it can only be applied in true lifeboat 
cases. And as we will see, by the time that any situation 
warrants the application of the worse-off principle, the 
issue of consent is moot. 
Consider that in order for there to be a true lifeboat 
case, a group of individuals must naturally share equally 
in a set of threatening circumstances, as opposed to 
being purposely placed in such circumstances. 13 
Moreover, in true lifeboat cases Lhe threatening 
circumstances are generally such that in order for most 
of the individuals to survive, one or some must 
undertake the full riskl4 (which can result in death) in 
place of the others. And none of the individuals has a 
choice to opt out of the circumstances. In a true lifeboat 
case such as this, Regan tells us that the worse-off 
principle allows the other members of the lifeboat to 
forcibly throw the nonhuman animal (the dog) 
overboard. Therefore, in the eventof a true lifeboat case, 
it is clear that even Regan does not require consent in 
order to apply the worse-off principle. 
However, if I understand Varner correctly, what he 
and I disagree on is whether membership in a true 
lifeboat group must occur naturally. In other words, we 
disagree over whether it would be permissible in some 
cases purposely to transfer lifeboat risks, without 
consent, to individuals who do not naturally find 
themselves in the lifeboat group. Regan disallows this 
because on a rights view "risks are not morally 
transferable to those who do not voluntarily choose to 
take them."15 However, Varner thinks, contrary to 
Regan, that there are at least some cases where people 
generally find iL acceprable to transfer risks in this way. 
Varner provides us with three examples of such cases: 
1) when military draft guidelines are modified in times 
of war; 2) when price support guidelines (e.g., for the 
fanning industry) are modified; and 3) when we go to 
war. And on the basis of these cases, Varner thinks that 
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the worse-off principle is sometimes applicable to 
individuals who are not naturally in the lifeboat. 
The flrst two examples involve redistributing risks 
without explicit consent. However, as Varner acknow-
ledges, if these types of policy decisions are made by a 
democratically elected government, one can argue that 
there is implicit consent from the people. Therefore, 
these examples are somewhat weak. for his purposes. 
This is why he proposes (3). When country A and 
country B go to war, each country forces the people of 
the other country to take on risks that they presumably 
do not voluntarily choose to take on. It is on the basis 
of this third type of case that Varner contends that there 
are cases where it is generally agreed that we can 
morally transfer risks to those who do not voluntarily 
choose to take them. It is on the basis of this third type 
of case that Varner thinks that the worse-off principle 
can be applied to individuals who do not naturally flnd 
themselves in the lifeboat group. It is on the basis of 
this third type of case that Varner holds that there may 
be an opening for convergence and consensus in the 
debate between utilitarian and inherent value theorists 
about the use of animals in biomedical research. 
The flrst problem that I have with this third case is 
that even if Varner is correct that it is a clear case of 
transferring risks without consent, it is not clear that 
there is any analogy between this type of case and the 
types of cases at issue, viz., biomedical research cases. 
That is to say, there is no analogy that would remotely 
suggest that we would be justifled in transferring risks 
in biomedical research cases. IfVarner wants to suggest 
that because we can flnd this one very odd case (when 
two countries go to war) where transferring risks is 
acceptable, we are justifled in transferring risks in all 
biomedical research cases where there is a human life 
at stake, his argument needs a lot of work. 
The main disanalogy between transferring risk 
when going to war and when performing biomedical 
research to save a human life is that the justiflcations 
used in each case are ofentirely different types. Country 
A may justify going to war with country B because 
country B represents a threat. In biomedical cases there 
is no such threat from nonhuman animals that would 
offer the kind of justiflcation needed to violate them 
merely for human ends. 
Of course, sensing a threat does not entirely 
comprehend the justiflcations one country might give 
for going to war against another country. Country A 
may go to war simply to take from country B what it 
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wants or needs (wars of conquest). And this would, at 
flrst glance, seem analogous to the biomedical testing 
cases. However, a war of conquest is prima jacie not a 
clear example of morally transferring risk; any more 
than mugging someone on the street corner to get what 
one needs is a clear example of morally transferring 
risk. Here, the analogy is tenuous at best. 
As a result of these problems with Varner's war 
analogy, I think that even in support of the possibility 
of a continued dialogue between the two sides, Varner's 
argument needs a lot of work. What the argument really 
needs is an example of a case of the transferring of risk 
without consent that bears some resemblance to the 
biomedical research case. What I suspect is that there 
are no such cases where risks are morally transferable 
without consent except, perhaps, in those where the 
individuals involved naturally flnd themselves in the 
lifeboat group. And as argued above, the worse-off 
principle would apply in these situations without the 
need for consent. 
The second problem that I have with this third case 
(of going to war) is that I'm not convinced that this is a 
clear case of transferring risks without consent. Any 
nation qua nation is primajacie an entity that must accept 
the possibility of going to war with other nations. So, 
just in virtue of being an individual member of a nation, 
one accepts the possibility that other nations might attack 
his or her nation. Therefore, in the same way that one 
accepts the risks transferred to him or her by the 
government that they help to elect, one accepts the risks 
transferred to him or her by the foreign nation that they 
implicitly accept as a potential enemy. Therefore, it is 
arguable that there is a kind of consent in cases such as 
(3), too. Again then, I think that what Varner's argument 
needs is a better example, and I suspect that there are 
none that will do the work his argument requires. 
IV 
Now, I do think that Regan's worse-off principle does 
provide an opening for fatal animal testing. However, 
it does not provide as wide an opening as Varner 
suggests. My problem with Varner's rendering of the 
implications of Regan's worse-off principle is that it 
is too quick to generalize the use of the worse-off 
principle to unexceptional cases. Regan rightly warns 
against this because it leads to a kind of perfectionism 
where the burdens of society are routinely shifted to 
the weaker and less valuable members so that the more 
36 Winter & Spring 1996 
A Critical Assessment o/Varner's Proposal/or Consensus and Convergence in the Biomedical Research Debate 
perfect individuals can better excel. This would clearly 
violate the rights view, as it would routinely treat 
individuals possessing inherent value merely as a 
means to others' ends.16 
How then does the worse-off principle provide an 
opening for fatal animal testing? Well, suppose that 
there are nonhuman animals who naturally find 
themselves in a lifeboat type group with humans in 
virtue of sharing the same disease. Within the confines 
of such a limited group, Varner's convergence argument 
works, for, according to Regan's view, the worse-off 
principle would be applicable to that group, and the 
nonconsenting nonhuman animal would be the obvious 
candidate for the testing. So, Varner's conclusion about 
Regan is correct, even though it does not apply to as 
large a group of nonhuman animals as his argument 
suggests. Only nonhuman animals who have member-
ship in the relevant afflicted group (Le., those who 
actually have the threatening condition) could be used 
for fatal testing. 
Now, even though Regan's worse-off principle 
allows fatal nonhuman animal testing to the extent just 
mentioned, I think that there is good reason to hold that 
the nonhuman animal would not in fact be the obvious 
candidate for testing on a true rights view. I argue below 
that this is because the worse-off principle itself is 
contradictory to the general spirit of a rights view. 
v 
Imagine that the five individuals in the lifeboat are all 
normal human beings. How would Regan's view handle 
such a case? According to Regan, the worse-off 
principle would not be applicable because the interests 
are comparable. And there does not seem to be a basis 
for making the decision according to the mini-ride 
principle either, for, even though this principle tells us 
to throw one individual overboard, it provides no 
guidelines to tell us which one. Each individual's 
capacities to form and satisfy desires are primn facie 
the same. Seemingly, there are no morally relevant 
criteria available for choosing which individual must 
go overboard. Therefore, neither of these principles 
provides an answer. For four of the five to survive, at 
least one individual must act unethically by throwing 
someone overboard, or someone must make the 
sacrifice voluntarily. 
First, I would like to state that I am not looking for 
a solution to this problem. I want to argue that the 
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lifeboat case where there are four humans and one 
nonhuman animal arguably presents the same difficulty 
as the lifeboat case where all the individuals are human 
beings. Therefore, it would not be possible to apply the 
worse-off principle to allow the sacrifice of the 
nonhuman animal. 
Recall that the worse-off principle involves 
weighing, in some manner, the capacities of the 
individuals in the group to form and satisfy desires. This 
must mean something like the following: what 
determines the value of an individual's capacities is the 
potential number and quality of the desires the 
individual can form and the power that the individual 
can direct in satisfaction of these desires. The greater 
this number, quality and power, the worse off an 
individual would be if he or she were the one to be 
forced to make the sacrifice. 
Now, suppose the lifeboat contained the President of 
the United States, a Ph.D. in astrophysics, Plato, 
Dostoyevsky, and a milkman. The milkman never 
received a high school education, is an active alcoholic, 
and beats his wife and children. He does not do much 
else. Sometimes he does not even deliver the milk. The 
rest of the members of the lifeboat group have lives full 
of varied interests and activities. Who goes overboard? 
It is more than likely that using the worse-off principle, 
and noting that this is a clear case of noncomparable 
harms, the milkman will be taking a swim. Regan has to 
allow this or run the risk ofharboring speciesist motives 
behind his worse-off principle. 
There are two clear reasons why people might be 
willing to accept the worse-offconclusion that the milkman 
should go overboard. However, neither of these reasons, 
I will argue, is sufficient to reach such a conclusion. 
First, people might have doubts about the milkman's 
innocence. If the milkman is not innocent, then 
according to the worse-off principle, the other people 
in the group do not have an obligation to treat him 
equally. However, according to Regan, even if the 
milkman is guilty of something, the punishment for this 
must fit the crimeP The harm inflicted by any 
punishment cannot be greater than the harm generally 
inflicted by the milkman. Therefore, the worst the others 
in the lifeboat could do to the milkman, without 
violating his inherent value, would be for them to get 
drunk, beat him, and occasionally refuse to give him 
milk. They could not throw him overboard. 
The second reason people might favor the 
conclusion of the worse-offprinciple, as Regan himself 
Between the Species 
A Critical Assessment ofVarner's Proposal for Consensus and Convergence in the Biomedical Research Debate 
does, is because the milkman's capacities for forming 
and satisfying desires are not as rich as those of the 
others in the lifeboat. Now, the assumption behind the 
application of the worse-off principle is that there is an 
objective standard by which to measure the richness, 
and therefore value, of an individual's life. But it seems 
clear to me that there is no possibility of such a standard. 
Absent an objective standard, only the standards of 
various groups would be available, e.g., the standards 
of Platonists or milkmen. However, to use a standard 
arrived at by some special interest group would be to 
ignore the very inherent value of subjects-of-a-life that 
Regan emphasizes. 
In order to avoid discounting the subject in this 
way, one must require that the value of a subject's life 
be measured according to the SUbject's own point of 
view. This is because it is the having of a point of 
view about one's world in the first place that makes 
an individual into a subject-of-a-life and is the basis 
for attributing rights to such an individual. So, 
adopting the first-person perspective as a method of 
determining the value that one life has compared to 
another is consistent with valuing the subject over 
utility. Now, I think that no normal, healthy individual 
would judge himself or herself to be less valuable than 
another. If this is true, then no normal healthy 
individual could be thrown overboard for having a less 
valuable life. In such severe lifeboat cases then, it is 
not at all obvious that the subject-of-a-life who 
happens to be a dog is the one who should go 
overboard, no more than it is obvious that the milkman 
should go overboard. 
Therefore, I think that we must conclude that 
Regan's worse-off principle has unacceptable 
consequences for a rights position. If I am correct, then 
the narrow opening for convergence that we were ready 
to grant Varner is also contrary to a rights view. All 
things considered then, the application of the worse-
off principle is an unlikely place to find convergence 
and consensus in the biomedical research debate. 
However, this failure does have potential for 
pointing us in another direction. All that we have to 
consider is a certain disanalogy between the milkman 
(or dog) lifeboat case and biomedical lifeboat cases 
generally. In the milkman lifeboat case, there were only 
two options available for resolution. Either some 
individual is forcibly thrown overboard in accord with 
the guidance of the worse-off principle (assuming that 
no one is willing to make a sacrifice), or all individuals 
would drown. I have not given a solution to this case 
but have only argued that the milkman case and the 
dog case present the same problem, to which the worse-
off principle gives no solution compatible with a rights 
view. This implies that if there is no other solution 
forthcoming, then we would have to declare that in such 
cases, all must drown (assuming that this is not itself 
an unethical conclusion). 
Fortunately, we are not seeking a solution to these 
types ofcases. We are interested in biomedical lifeboat 
cases, and in biomedical lifeboat cases there is a third 
option available to the individuals in the lifeboat which 
is unavailable to the individuals in the milkman 
lifeboat. The individuals in the biomedical lifeboat can 
undergo biomedical testing in an attempt to save 
themselves. 18 This direction distributes risks to those 
who stand to benefit from taking them, and leaves the 
decision up to each individual in the lifeboat as to 
whether the risks are reasonable. Of course, animals 
cannot make these decisions themselves. However, I 
think it is possible for panels of animal advocates to 
make these decisions for animals. These panels can 
be arranged so that the decisions made by them for 
animals approximate, to a good degree of accuracy, 
the decisions that average normal humans would make 
under similar circumstances.19 
In order to find a solution to the rapprochement issue 
that does not violate the rights of individuals, but 
provides for the possibility of fruitful biomedical 
testing, I believe that exploiting the implications of this 
disanalogy between severe lifeboat cases (e.g., the 
milkman or dog case) and biomedical lifeboat cases is 
the direction to take.20 
I would like to thank Gary Varner for his comments 
on the earlier draft of this paper. 
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